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Abstract
This paper studies optimal discretionary monetary policy and its interaction
with scal policy in a New Keynesian model with nitely-lived consumers and gov-
ernment debt. Optimal discretionary monetary policy involves debt stabilization to
reduce consumption dispersion across cohorts of consumers. The welfare relevance
of debt stabilization is proportional to the debt-to-output ratio and inversely related
to the households probability of survival that a¤ects the households propensity
to consume out nancial wealth. Debt stabilization bias implies that discretionary
optimal policy is suboptimal compared with the ination targeting rule that fully
stabilizes the output gap and the ination rate while leaving debt to freely uctuate
in response to demand shocks.
JEL Classi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It is clear that there are other economic policy instruments which could
improve the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy in closing the output gap. In
the past, the limited space for the development of scal policy has increased
the burden on monetary policy...
Excerpt of speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, Prometeia,
Bologna, 14 December 2015.
1 Introduction
Researchers have actively pursued the study of optimal monetary policy over the past
four decades.1 One central assumption across several studies is the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem, which posits that if consumers are innitely lived, have complete asset market
participation and taxation is not distortive (i.e., lump-sum taxes), scal policy will not
not a¤ect consumersdecisions. In other words, changes in public debt fails to inuence
aggregate demand. Within this framework, inuential studies by Clarida et al. (1999)
and Woodford (2003) demonstrate that ination and output gap stabilization are the
optimal monetary policy objective. However, it is di¢ cult to reconcile the study of
optimal monetary policy in isolation from scal policy, given that the remit of several
central banks is to operate monetary policy under stable and prudent debt limits set by
governments.2 As indicated by the introducing excerpt of this article, scal policy is of
primal consideration for the conduct of monetary policy.3
The goal of our paper is to investigate the conduct of optimal monetary policy and
the interplay between monetary and scal policy in a non-Ricardian model. To this pur-
pose, we incorporate the overlapping generation (OLG) model of Blanchard-Yaari in a
1See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2010) and references therein for a comprehensive review of
the literature.
2For instance, the U.K. Treasury and the European Commission set the limit of the debt-to-output
ratio to 40% and below 60%, respectively.
3See Abbas et al. (2014) for an overview of debt levels across countries for the period 1900-2011.
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tractable New Keynesian framework. The model accommodates consumers of di¤erent
cohorts, who face a constant probability of dying, and movements in debt holdings that
generate critical wealth e¤ects that inuence consumption. Since nominal price rigidi-
ties create a link between real activity and ination, changes in scal policy that a¤ect
consumption also generate relevant interplay between scal and monetary policy. By
setting the consumersprobability of survival equal to one, the model nests the standard
Ricardian framework with innitely-lived consumers. It therefore enables us to draw
direct comparisons with related studies. Monetary policy is set optimally under discre-
tion to minimize the welfare loss due to demand shocks while lump-sum taxes change
proportionally to debt movements.4
This study establishes the following results. First, in non-Ricardian economies, debt
stabilization becomes an additional goal for monetary policy over and above the sta-
bilization of ination and output gap obtained in standard Ricardian economies. The
intuition of this result is straightforward. In the model, lifespan is nite and uctua-
tions in debt holdings fail to be o¤set by proportional movements in lump-sum taxation,
making movements in debt holdings relevant for consumption. The OLG framework pro-
duces consumption di¤erentials across di¤erent cohorts of consumers that are amplied
by issuance of government debt. Because dispersion in consumption is welfare-reducing,
movements in debt holdings introduce a tradeo¤ between the stabilization of ination
and the output gap.5
Second, optimal discretionary monetary policy is more complex than in Ricardian
economies. It requires us to track current and expected ination and the output gap
in conjunction with movements in debt holdings. The relevance of debt stabilization
depends on the extent to which consumption reacts to changes in debt holdings that
4We depart from similar framework in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2013) by assuming lump-sum taxation.
5Rajan (2015) discusses the relevance of consumption dispersion for welfare and monetary policy. He
notes that a serious attempt to link consumption dispersion with monetary policy requires to dwell on
political economy issues, which are ignored by the majority of studies. The inclusion of political economy
considerations will certainly be an interesting, albeit contentious, topic for future research.
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rely on the the degree of the debt-to-output ratio and the lifespan of consumers. Life
expectancy is critical for the dynamic properties of the model. When the probability
of survival matches the average life expectancy of households in advanced economies,
the dynamic properties of the model are similar to the Ricardian economy. In this case,
optimal monetary policy chiey stabilizes the output gap and ination, allowing real
debt holdings to uctuate in response to exogenous demand shocks. However, when the
probability of survival decreases, changes in real debt holdings retain important welfare
e¤ects, and debt stabilization becomes a quantitatively important objective of monetary
policy.6
Third, this research establishes important interactions between monetary and scal
policy. The strength of the response of scal policy to debt changes is critical for the
tradeo¤ for monetary policy. For example, when the response of taxes to changes in real
debt is strong, the real interest rate reacts less to demand shocks and monetary policy
primarily focuses on stabilizing output gap and ination. As the reaction of taxes to debt
uctuations decreases, the real interest rate response to shocks strengthens and monetary
policy is more likely to stabilize debt.
Fourth, an ination targeting rule is welfare-enhancing compared with the optimal
discretionary policy. Although debt stabilization in a non-Ricardian economy is impor-
tant for welfare, the optimal monetary policy under discretion is still characterized by
debt stabilization bias,and monetary policy may strategically allow the uctuations
of ination and output gap to reduce movements of real debt holdings, consistent with
the ndings in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) in a model with a representative agent. Any
attempt to reduce movements in real debt holdings is welfare-reducing compared with
an ination targeting rule that stabilizes output gap and ination.
Our paper is related to studies that investigate the tradeo¤s of monetary policy in
non-Ricardian economies. Bilbiie (2008) develops a non-Ricardian model that embeds
6Del Negro et al. (2012) and Nisticó (2016) provide alternative interpretations of the parameter
measuring the consumersprobability of survival. We further discuss this issue in section 4.2.
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limited asset market participation, establishing that optimal monetary policy weakly
responds to ination. Andres et al. (2013) develop a New Keynesian model with nancial
frictions in the form of collateral constraints and a monopolistically competitive banking
sector. They nd that optimal monetary policy faces a non-trivial tradeo¤ between
the stabilization of output gap, ination, the consumption gap between borrowers
and savers, and a housing gapthat measures the distortion in the distribution of the
collateralizable asset between both groups. Nisticó (2016) studies optimal monetary
policy and stock price dynamics in a non-Ricardian model that embeds limited asset
market participation across agents of di¤erent cohorts. He establishes that the objective
of the monetary authority also includes nancial stability as an additional target to
ination and the output gap. Compared to these studies, we develop a New Keynesian
version of the Blanchard-Yaari model that focuses on the e¤ect of government debt, and in
particular, we focus on the interaction between scal and monetary policy. By contrast,
the aforementioned studies, with the exception of Bilbiie (2008), focus exclusively on
monetary policy.
Our paper also is related to studies that investigate the interaction between scal and
monetary policy Kirsanova et al. (2007) investigate scal policy issues with non-Ricardian
consumers based on the Blanchard-Yaari framework. In an open economy model, they
nd that simple scal rules, which account for di¤erences in ination and output across
countries, are e¤ective in reducing the impact of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union.
Chadha and Nolan (2007) also embed the Blanchard-Yaari framework into a New Keyne-
sian model to characterize systematic, simple monetary and scal policy over the business
cycle. They establish that conducting a stabilization policy requires scal policy that ac-
counts for automatic stabilizers and monetary policy that responds strongly to ination.
Leith and von Thadden (2008) nd that in non-Ricardian economies, the e¤ect of scal
policy on the determinacy of the system depends on the level of government debt. Unlike
these studies that use optimal exogenous rules, we perform our analysis in the context of
4
a microfounded welfare function, and we focus on the interplay between optimal mone-
tary and scal policy. This approach allows us to investigate the extent to which debt
holdings and scal policy interplay with monetary policy.
Finally, this analysis is related to Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) who study the interplay between monetary and scal policies in a repre-
sentative agent framework with distortionary taxes and time inconsistent policies. Using
a similar framework, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) show that under time consistency the
policymaker strategically use changes in real debt holdings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model
and derives the aggregate equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the welfare function in a
non-Ricardian economy. Section 4 derives the optimal discretionary monetary policy and
it obtains the nominal interest rate that implements optimal discretionary policy. This
section also investigates the dynamic properties of optimal policy. Section 5 compares
the optimal policy against the ination targeting rule. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model is a discrete time version of the Blanchard-Yaari OLG framework. It comprises
a continuum of consumers indexed by i 2 [0; 1] of di¤erent ages, s, each of which faces a
survival rate of , a continuum of imperfectively competitive rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1],
where rm j produces good j, a government and a central bank. The model features
enough symmetry to allow the analysis to focus on the behavior of a representative
consumer for each cohort, making it straightforward to aggregate across di¤erent cohorts
and rms. In what follows, we describe the activities of each agent and their implications
for the evolution of equilibrium prices and quantities.
5
2.1 Consumers
During each period, t = 0; 1; 2; ::: a new cohort, s, of unitary size is born while existing
consumers face a constant probability of surviving , independent of age. Population
growth is zero, implying that the population size is constant and equal to 1=(1  ), and
there is no bequest motive, implying that newborns do not hold assets at their births,
although they own the present discounted value of their labor income (net of taxes and
transfers). As in Blanchard (1985), we assume that insurance companies collect nancial
wealth from deceased consumers and pay a premium to survivors proportional to their
nancial wealth, such that each consumer receives a return equal to 1= for each unit of
nancial wealth in each period.
During each period, t = 0; 1; 2; :::, each consumer i of age s consumes a bundle of
goods, Cs;t (i), dened by the CES aggregator over the goods manufactured by each rm
j,
Cs;t (i) =
Z 1
0
Cs;t (i; j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
; (1)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among di¤erent goods varieties, j, and
supplies labour, Ns;t (i), to maximize the expected utility function:

s;t (i) = Et
1X
t=0
tt flogCs;t (i) + ' log [1 Ns;t (i)]g ; (2)
where  is the discount rate, and ' measures the degree to which leisure (1   Ns;t (i))
contributes to utility.
Each consumer i of age s enters period t with bonds, Bs;t (i), supplies units of labor,
Ns;t (i), at the nominal wage rate, Wt, and earns equity payouts, Dt. The consumer uses
income to purchase new bonds, whose expected value is F st;t+1Bs;t+1 (i), where F
s
t;t+1
denotes the subjective discount factor at time t, to consume Cs;t (i), and to pay lump-
sum nominal taxes, t. Finally, the consumer receives lump-sum transfers, Ts;t. Hence,
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the following budget constraint holds:
PtCs;t (i) + Et

F st;t+1Bs;t+1 (i)
  WtNs;t (i) +Bs;t (i) +Dt  t   Ts;t; (3)
where Pt =
hR 1
0
Pt (j)
1  dj
i 1
1 
is the aggregate price index. As we will discuss later, to
ensure that the steady state is e¢ cient, we assume that lump-sum transfers are equal to:
Ts;t = St + Vs;t; (4)
where St is an employment subsidy to rms that o¤sets distortions generated by monop-
olistic competition in the goods market, which is set as a proportion { of the rms wage
bill, such that St = {WtNt(j). The second component, Vs;t, is transferred to consumers
to equate the distribution of steady-state debt holdings across generations. This compo-
nent is a cohort-specic transfer that ensures uniqueness of the steady state and has no
e¤ect on the aggregate dynamics of the economy7:
Vs;t = F
s
t;t+1Vs; (5)
with Vs = (Bs  B), where B is the per capita nominal steady-state debt, and Bs is the
steady-state nominal debt for the generation of age s in absence of this redistribution
scheme.8 Finally, we impose that the real debt holdings of consumers must satisfy:
lim
k!1
Et

zst;t+kkBs;t+k
	
= 0; (6)
7In principle, the government may use lump-sum taxes to balance the budget in each period or to o¤set
di¤erences in nancial wealth across cohorts that are critical to depart from Ricardian equivalence. Since
we are interested in the interactions between monetary and scal policy in a Non-Ricardian economy,
we assume that the government in unable to implement these policies and that lump-sum taxes are set
according to equation (18). This assumption implies that the government attains a balanced budget and
consumers hold the same level of government debt in the steady state only.
8Nisticó (2016) uses a similar redistribution scheme in the context of an asset market model.
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where zst;t+k =
Yk
l=0
zst;t+l. Hence, the consumer chooses fCs;t (i) ; Ns;t (i) ; Bs;t+1 (i)g1t=0
to maximize the utility function (2) subject to the budget constraint (3). The rst order
conditions for this problem are:
1
Cs;t (i)
= Et

1
Cs;t+1 (i)
1
F st;t+1
Pt
Pt+1

; (7)
and
Wt
Pt
= '
Cs;t (i)
1 Ns;t (i) : (8)
Equations (7) and (8) are standard Euler-consumption and labor supply equations,
respectively.
As shown in Woodford (2003), the expected price Et

zst;t+1
	
of a one-period riskless
asset is the reciprocal of the (gross) short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, that is:
Et

zst;t+1
	
= k
Cs;t
Cs;t+1
Pt
Pt+1
=
1
Rt
: (9)
By solving the Euler equation (7) forward, using the budget constraint (3) and im-
posing the no-Ponzi scheme condition, we express individual consumption as a linear
function of nancial wealth, Bs;t (i), and human wealth, Hs;t (i), dened as an expected
stream of future income from wages and dividends net of taxes and transfers:9
PtCs;t (i) =
1
(1 + ') s;t
[Bs;t (i)  Vs +Ht (i)] ; (10)
where
Ht (i) = Et
1X
k=0
zst;t+kk (Wt+k +Dt+k  t+k   St+k) ; (11)
9The model entails incomplete nancial markets and therefore the certainty-equivalence principle fails
hold. However, since the equilibrium of the system is linearized around the non-stochastic steady state,
the dynamic model retains certainty-equivalence properties. In the linearized model, the propensity to
consume out nancial and human wealth is equal to (1 ).
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and s;t is the inverse of the propensity to consume nancial and human wealth:
s;t = 1 +
1X
k=1
()k
kY
j=1
Et

qs;t+j
qs;t+j 1

;
with:
qs;t+j =
j 1Y
z=0
Rt+z
Pt+zCs;t+z
Et
0BBBBB@
Pt+zCs;t+z
j 1Y
z=0
Rt+z
1CCCCCA :
Equation (11) and equation (9) show that human wealth is the same across cohorts.
Therefore, di¤erences in consumption across di¤erent cohorts of consumers are driven by
the accumulation of nancial wealth.
2.2 Firms
During each period t = 0; 1; 2; :::, rms hire Nt(j) units of labor from consumers to man-
ufacture Yt(j) units of a good, j, according to the constant returns-to-scale production
technology described by
Yt(j) = ZtNt(j): (12)
The aggregate productivity shock, Zt, evolves according to the law of motion:
ln(Zt) = z ln(Zt 1) + z;t;
where 0 < z < 1, and z;t is a stochastic shock with zero mean and standard deviation
equal to z. Given the CES form of consumption bundles, integrating the demand for
the good j across consumers and assuming that the government allocates spending in
the same pattern as consumers implies that the demand for product j is given by:
Yt(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 
Yt; (13)
9
where Yt =
R 1
0
Yt(j)dj.
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that each rm sets a new price, P t (j), with prob-
ability (1  ) during each period t = 0; 1; 2; :::. In particular, rm j chooses fP t (j)g1t=0
to maximize its total market value, given by:
Et
1X
t=0


Rt
t
Dt(j)
Pt
; (14)
where:
Dt(j) = P

t (j)Yt (j)  (1  {)WtNt (j) (15)
denotes the rm j prots net of employment subsidy, subject to production technology
(12) and the demand function (13). Rt is the gross nominal interest rate. The rst order
condition for this problem is:
P t (j) =

   1
1X
t=0


Rt
t
(1  {) Yt
P 1 t
Wt
Zt
1X
t=0


Rt
t
Yt
P 1 t
: (16)
Firms that fail to optimize prices keep them unchanged. As a result, the aggregate
price index, Pt, can be rewritten as a weighted average of newly set prices, P t , and
those set in the previous period, Pt 1, where the weights are linked to the probability of
re-optimizing prices. Therefore, the aggregate price index can be written as:
Pt =
h
 (Pt 1)
1  + (1  ) (P t )1 
i 1
1 
:
2.3 Government and Central Bank
During each period, t = 0; 1; 2; :::, the government issues one-period bonds, Bt+1, that
pay a gross nominal interest rate, Rt, and raises lump-sum taxes, t, to nance public
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spending, Gt, and service outstanding debt, Bt. Hence, the government budget constraint
is:
Bt+1=Rt +t = Bt +Gt; (17)
where public spending, Gt, evolves according to the law of motion: ln(Gt) = g ln(Gt 1)+
g;t, with 0 < g < 1; the stochastic shock, g;t, has zero mean and standard deviation is
equal to g.
As in Leith and von Thadden (2008), scal policy is described by a simple rule, which
takes the following form:
t = + 1 (Bt  B) ; (18)
where  is the steady state level of taxes, and 1 > 0 is the reaction of taxation to
outstanding debt. Fiscal policy described in equation (18) implies that the government
responds to debt deviations from its steady state.
The central bank is in charge of setting the nominal interest rate, which can be
determined optimally to maximize the social welfare. Section 4 characterizes the nominal
interest rate that implements optimal discretionary monetary policy.
2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
To aggregate across cohorts, we assume that consumers in the same cohort behave identi-
cally. Therefore we can drop the index i and consider a representative consumer for each
cohort. To study the properties of the aggregate economy, we aggregate across di¤erent
cohorts and rewrite the model in per capita terms using the rule:
Xt = (1  )
1X
s=0
sXs;t; (19)
where we take the general variable Xs;t referred to the specic cohort s, and rescale it
for the number of consumers in the cohort (s), dividing by the size of the population
11
(1= (1  )) to obtain the per capita value of variableXt. If we apply this rule to equation
(10) recalling that human wealth dened by equation (11) is independent from the
cohort and that the redistribution scheme Vs;t is equal to zero when aggregated across
generations we obtain the per capita consumption equation:
PtCt =
1
(1 + ') 
(Bt +Ht) : (20)
Similarly, the per capita version of the Euler equation (7) is:
Ct =
1
Rt
Et
Pt+1
Pt
~Ct+1; (21)
where ~Ct+1 =
1 

1X
s=1
sCs;t+1 (i) is the per capita consumption in period t + 1 of con-
sumers alive in period t. Per capita consumption in period t + 1 can be rewritten as a
weighted sum between the per capita consumption of two groups of consumers: those
already alive in period t and newborns in period t+ 1 (CNBt+1 ), where the weights are the
size of the two groups:
Ct+1 =  ~Ct+1 + (1  )CNBt+1 : (22)
Combining equation (22) and (21), we obtain:
Ct   1
Rt
Et
Pt+1
Pt
Ct+1 =
(1  )

1
Rt
Et
Pt+1
Pt
 
CNBt+1   Ct+1

: (23)
Equation (23) di¤ers from the Euler equation for consumption with Ricardian agents
for the term proportional to the gap between consumption of newborns in period t + 1
and the per capita consumption. However, note that deriving equation (10) for newborns
(that implies Bs;t = 0 and Vs = B for newborns) and subtracting the outcome to equation
(20) yields:
Et
 
CNBt+1   Ct+1

= Et
1
(1 + ') 
(bt+1   b) ; (24)
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where bt+1 and b are the real bond holdings at the beginning of time t+1 and at the steady-
state, respectively. Equation (24) reveals that the di¤erence between the consumption
of newborns and per capita consumption is proportional to the deviation of per capita
wealth from its equilibrium level.10 Finally, combining equations (23) and (24), we derive
the dynamic equation of per capita consumption:
Ct =
1
Rt
Et
Pt+1
Pt

Ct+1 +
1  

1
(1 + ') 
(bt+1   b)

: (25)
Equation (25) shows that when the probability of surviving is high (i.e.  ! 1) and
when the propensity to consume nancial wealth falls (i.e. 1= (1 + ') ! 0), movements
in real bond holdings have a limited e¤ect on aggregate consumption.
Using equation (8), the per capita labor supply is:
Wt
Pt
= '
Ct
1 Nt : (26)
Substituting equation (13) into equation (12) and aggregating across rms yields:
tYt = ZtNt; (27)
where t =
R 1
0
[Pt(j)=Pt]
  dj is an index of price dispersion. We derive the aggregate
resource constraint by combining the aggregate consumer budget constraint (3), the rm
prots equation (15) and the government budget constraint (17), which yields:
Yt = Ct +Gt: (28)
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate
under discretion as the result of a linear-quadratic optimization problem, as in Woodford
10This property of the model results from the fact that human wealth is the same across cohorts, as
shown in equation (11).
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(2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2012).
2.5 The Linearized Equilibrium
To provide a tractable, analytical solution of the model, we linearize the equilibrium
conditions around the stationary steady state.11 We express each variable in deviation
from its value at the e¢ cient equilibrium that occurs when a benevolent central planner
sets the allocations. We also derive the allocations in a exible price equilibrium to
facilitate the interpretation of results.
We determine e¢ cient allocations by a benevolent social planner who maximizes util-
ity (2), subject to the production technology in equation (12) and the resource constraint
in equation (28). The rst order conditions are:
Zt = '
Cet
1 N et
; (29)
Y et = C
e
t +Gt; (30)
where the superscript edenotes the e¢ cient level of the variable. Equations (29) and
(30) show that consumption and the labor supply are equalized across consumers and
that debt holdings are irrelevant for the equilibrium.
To achieve the e¢ cient equilibrium dened by equations (29) and (30), we correct
for the distortions introduced by monopolistic competition and the di¤erences in debt
holdings across generations.
To describe the linearized equilibrium, we let the symbol bdenote the percentage
(logarithmic) deviation of the variable from its steady-state value.12 To study optimal
monetary policy, we rewrite the system in terms of the output gap (x^t), dened as
11Appendix A reports the derivation of the model.
12Appendix A shows the derivation of the steady state of the model. Public spending is dened
in deviations from the steady state of output (since the steady state of G is zero), such that g^t =
(Gt  G) =Y .
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the deviation of output from its e¢ cient level or as the di¤erence between the output
deviations from its steady state under sticky prices (y^et ) and e¢ cient allocation (y^
e
t ), such
that x^t = y^t   y^et , where13
y^et = z^t +
1
(1 + )
g^t: (31)
The linearized model comprises three endogenous variables {x^t; ^t; b^t} and two ex-
ogenous variables {bzt; bgt}. The dynamics of endogenous variables are described by the
following set of equations:
x^t = Etx^t+1   (brt   Ett+1   %^et) + (1  )(1 + ')  B b^t+1; (32)
^t = Et^t+1 + x^t; (33)
b^t+1 = (brt   Et^t+1   %^et) + 1 (1  1) b^t + f t ; (34)
where  = [(1  ) (1  ) (1 + )] =,  = N=(1  N) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, and B is the steady-state debt-to-output ratio (i.e., B = B=Y ). The
variable %^et in equations (32) and (34) denotes the e¢ cient natural interest rate:
%^et =

 
1  g

1 + 
g^t   (1  z) z^t: (35)
The variable f t tracks movements in exogenous shocks:
f t = %^
e
t +
1
B
g^t;
and it introduces a tradeo¤ between the full stabilization of ination and the output gap
in the Euler equation (32) that precludes complete debt stabilization as an objective of
monetary policy.
13The presence of a subsidy makes the steady-state level of output identical to the e¢ cient level of
output (Y = Y e). Therefore: x^t = (Yt   Y et )=Y = y^t   y^et .
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The exogenous variables of technology and government spending, bzt and bgt, evolve
according to the law of motion: bzt = zbzt 1+z;t and bgt = gbgt 1+g;t, where z;t and z;t
are white noise innovations. Equations (32)-(34) help us interpret tradeo¤s for monetary
policy. In the Ricardian economy, which assumes that consumers are innitively lived
(i.e.,  = 1), debt holdings have no real e¤ects (i.e., the last term related to debt holdings
in equation (32) drops out), and the optimal policy involves setting the nominal interest
rate to track the e¢ cient interest rate. Such policy simultaneously stabilizes ination and
the output gap. However, if the economy is non-Ricardian and consumers are nitely lived
(i.e.  < 1), debt holdings retain a powerful wealth e¤ect and inuence consumption, as
shown in equation (32). A policy that sets brt = %^et is suboptimal since monetary policy
is unable to simultaneously stabilize ination, the output gap and debt holdings. In
this sense, debt holdings generate an endogenous tradeo¤ between ination and output
gap stabilization that emerges from any shock occurring in the economy. By contrast,
in Ricardian economies, a tradeo¤ between the output gap and ination arises in the
presence of exogenous cost-push shocks only, as discussed in Woodford (2003).
3 The Welfare Function
This section characterizes the welfare function for the non-Ricardian economy using a
linear-quadratic approximation of consumersutility, as in Woodford (2003) and Benigno
and Woodford (2012).14
By deriving a microfounded welfare function, we address critical issues pertaining to
the use of OLG models for welfare analysis. Calvo (1983) points out that welfare analysis
should account for the utility of unborn generations to prevent time inconsistency related
to the di¤erent impact of policies across cohorts. Similarly, Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis
14As outlined in section 2.5, we assume an e¢ cient steady state, achieved by employment subsidies
that o¤set the distortion from monopolistic competition and transfers that equate debt across cohorts
in equilibrium.
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(2012) argue that the welfare function should aggregate consumption across generations,
weighted for the utility in each generation. Our analysis internalizes these issues and
accounts for the utility of unborn generations by the dispersion of consumption across
generations, leading to di¤erent welfare objectives.15
Proposition 1 If the steady state is e¢ cient, the aggregate welfare function, 
t, can be
approximated by (ignoring terms independent from policy and of third or higher order):

t '  1
2
1X
t=0
t

axx^
2
t + 
2
t + ~abvarsc^t

; (36)
where ax = = and ~ab = ax=.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 shows that in a non-Ricardian economy, the welfare function depends
on three terms. The rst term is ination because it creates ine¢ cient price dispersion.
The second term is the output gap since nominal price rigidities generate ine¢ ciency
in output and labor input uctuations. These two terms also are present in Ricardian
economies. The third term refers to the volatility of consumption across di¤erent cohorts
of consumers, which encapsulates the distortions associated with non-Ricardian con-
sumers. This additional term becomes part of the welfare function since a convex utility
implies that dispersion of consumption across consumers belonging to di¤erent cohorts
reduces welfare. In a non-Ricardian economy, aggregate utility depends not only on the
aggregate level of consumption, as in the Ricardian model, but also on the variability of
consumption around the aggregate level.
To further interpret Proposition 1, we show that the dispersion of consumption across
cohorts is tightly linked to the deviation of debt from its steady state and that move-
ments in bond holdings are relevant for welfare. We re-express the welfare function in
15Nisticó (2016) provides a related analysis in the context of a model with stock-wealth e¤ects.
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equation (36) in terms of deviations in bond holdings from the steady state, which proves
convenient for the subsequent analysis and the interpretation of results.
Lemma 1 In any period t, the variability of consumption across generations is a function
of the dispersion of expected consumption in period t+1 and the deviation of the per-capita
real debt from the steady state:
varsc^t =
1

varsEtc^t+1 + (1  )

B

2
b^2t : (37)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 identies a precise mapping between the dispersion of consumption and
movements in real bond holdings. In particular, equation (37) shows that the dispersion
of consumption relates to the deviation of the average per capita real debt from the steady
state. In a non-Ricardian economy populated by nitely-lived consumers, movements in
bond holdings are not o¤set by proportional current or future movements in taxes, and
government debt exerts real e¤ects on consumption. Using Lemma 1, we reinterpret the
welfare function, as outlined in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If the steady state is e¢ cient, the aggregate welfare function can be ex-
pressed as:

t =
1X
t=0
tLt   1
2
1X
t=0
t
h
axx^
2
t + ^
2
t + abb^
2
t
i
(38)
where:
ab =
(1  )


1

B
1 + '
2
~ab:
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 establishes that in a non-Ricardian economy, welfare also depends on the
extent to which bond holdings deviate from the equilibrium level since, as discussed above
and shown in Lemma 1, movements in bond holdings generate dispersion in consumption
that is welfare reducing.
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By assuming that consumers are innitely lived (i.e.  = 1), the model nests the
standard Ricardian economy in which bond holdings have no real e¤ect and therefore no
welfare e¤ects. In this instance, a monetary policy that stabilizes ination also achieves
a zero output gap in the absence of cost-push shocks, as shown in Woodford (2003).16
Instead, when consumers are nitely lived (i.e.  < 1), Proposition 2 shows that the
presence of non-Ricardian consumers generates a tradeo¤ between ination, the output
gap and debt stabilization. To gain an understanding on the policy tradeo¤ faced by the
monetary authority, we compare the results to an economy with exible prices. Under
exible prices, the monetary authority has no inuence on the real interest rate, which
tracks one-to-one the natural interest rate and consequently uctuates in response of
exogenous shocks. This policy stabilizes the output gap (i.e. x^t = Etx^t+1, from the
Euler equation (32)) and allows the real debt holdings to freely uctuate in response
to exogenous shocks. The monetary authority achieves stabilization of ination and the
output gap by letting debt holdings freely uctuate in response to exogenous shocks. In
contrast, under nominal price rigidities, the monetary authority faces a tradeo¤ between
the stabilization of ination, the output gap and debt holdings, and it uses the real
interest rate to control debt and improve welfare.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal Interaction
This section focuses on the interaction between optimal monetary and scal policy. We
rst derive the optimal discretionary monetary policy and investigate its dynamic prop-
erties in relation to scal policy. We then specify and interpret an operational Taylor
rule that is consistent with the optimal policy.
16To see this in the context of the model, by keeping ination on target, the Phillips curve in equation
(33) implies that the output gap also is closed. Therefore no welfare loss occurs.
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4.1 Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy
The analytical solution for the optimal discretionary policy is complicated by the co-
existence of forward- and backward-looking variables. To overcome this issue, we postu-
late that forward-looking variables evolve in relation to a set of assigned state variables,
as in Maskin and Tirole (2001). We assume that the expected output gap (Etx^t+1) and
ination (Et^t+1) evolve in relation to the endogenous state variable of debt holdings
(b^t+1) and the exogenous state variables of disturbances (f t ), according to the equations:
Etx^t+1 = m1b^t+1 +m2f

t ; (39)
Et^t+1 = n1b^t+1 + n2f

t ; (40)
where m1, m2, n1 and n2 are unknown coe¢ cients. Substituting equations (39) and (40)
into the Euler equation (32) and the Philips-curve equation (33) and the law of motion
of bond holdings into equation (34), yields:
x^t =   (brt   %^et) + (	B +m1 + n1) b^t+1 + (m2 + n2) f t ; (41)
^t =   (brt   %^et) + [n1 +  (	B +m1 + n1)] b^t+1 + (m2 + n2 + n2) f t ; (42)
b^t+1 =
brt   %^et
1 + n1

+
1  1
 (1 + n1)
b^t +

1  n2
1 + n1

f t : (43)
where 	B = (1  ) B= (1 + '). Equations (41)-(43) are isomorphic to the original
system of equations (32)-(34), but the forward-looking variables, Etx^t+1 and Et^t+1, are
expressed in terms of the endogenous state variables, b^t+1 and f t .
The optimization problem of the monetary authority solves the following Bellman
equation:
V (bt; f

t ) = min
rt

 1
2

xx^
2
t + 
2
t + bb^
2
t

+ EtV
 
bt+1; f

t+1

; (44)
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subject to constraints given by equations (41)-(43). The nominal interest rate (brt) is the
control variable, and the real debt holding (b^t+1) is the endogenous state variable.17 The
following proposition denes the optimal discretionary monetary policy.
Proposition 3 Under discretionary monetary policy, the optimal rule is:
(1  1) [xEtx^t+1 + Et^t+1]+bb^t+1 = x (1 	B  m1) x^t+[ (1 	B  m1)  n1] ^t:
(45)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 establishes that the condition for optimal monetary policy is more
involved than the equivalent policy in the Ricardian framework, which is obtained by
assuming innitely-lived consumers (i.e., by setting  = 1 in equation (45)):
xx^t + kbt = 0: (46)
Since debt holdings are part of the optimization problem of non-Ricardian consumers,
the optimal policy is dynamic and comprises present and expected value of the output
gap and ination, jointly, with the value of debt holding. Therefore, as outlined in the
previous section and in Proposition 3, the stabilization of output gap and the ination
rate is suboptimal for monetary policy because this policy involves ine¢ cient uctuations
in debt holdings.
On one hand, uctuations in real debt holdings increase consumption dispersion across
cohorts, which in turn reduce aggregate welfare, as established in Lemma 1. On the other
hand, uctuations in real debt are important because they also a¤ect the output gap and
may have a non-trivial e¤ect on welfare, as shown in equation (32). To disentangle
17Ination and the output gap from equations (41)-(42) can be substituted into equation (44). In this
way, the solution of the recursive problem involves the choice of the control variable, r^t, subject to the
law of motion of the real debt holdings. Note that, unlike in the Ricardian economy, the interest rate
that stabilizes the output gap cannot be derived from the Euler equation for consumption, which is a
binding constraint in our optimization problem.
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these two e¤ects, we consider the special case of a monetary policy that maximizes the
utility of the average consumer in contrast to the utility across di¤erent cohorts.18 In this
example, consumers are still nitely lived (i.e.  < 1), but the monetary authority fails to
internalize the e¤ect of consumption dispersion across cohorts. As a result, uctuations
in bond holdings become irrelevant for welfare (which is equivalent to set ab = 0 in
equation (38)) despite movements in debt holdings that continue to inuence aggregate
consumption. The optimal policy becomes:
	(xx^t + kt) = (1  1) (xEtx^t+1 + kEtt+1) ; (47)
where 	 = 1 	B: Since the inequality, 	= (1  1) > 1, holds for plausible calibrations
of the model, the unique solution, xx^t + kbt = 0, to equation (47) rules out explosive
paths for output gap and ination rate. It coincides with the solution in the Ricardian
economy, as outlined in equation (46). If consumption dispersion is irrelevant for welfare,
optimal policy remains the same as in the Ricardian economy, even though consumers
are nitely lived and the law of bonds accumulation in equation (34) holds.
4.2 Dynamic Properties of Optimal Discretionary Policy
To simulate and study the dynamic properties of the model, we nd analytical solutions
to the four unknown parameters,m1,m2, n1 and n2, in equations (39) and (40). We dene
an additional equation that describes the evolution of the endogenous state variable:
b^t+1 = w1b^t + w2f

t : (48)
18For simplicity, we assume that consumption and worked hours of the representative household are
equal to their per capita value. The welfare loss is then derived as described in appendix B, with the
exception that we do not need to aggregate across di¤erent cohorts of consumers.
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By using equation (48), we can express the unknown coe¢ cients, m1, m2, n1 and n2, in
equations (39) and (40) in terms of the parameters, w1 and w2, in equation (48):
m1 =
1

(1  1) 	w1
1  w1 ; (49)
m2 =  ~m2 = 
m1w2 + 1 	w2
1   ; (50)
n1 =
m1
1  w1 ; (51)
n2 = ~n2 = 
n1w2 +  ~m2
1   ; (52)
w2 =
(x ~m2 + ~n2) [	 m1   (1  1) ]  n1~n2
(1  1)xm1 + (1  1)n1 + b
: (53)
We can solve equations (48)-(53) recursively once we determine the value of w1.19
To select a value for w1 among admissible solutions, we use the minimal state variable
(MSV) method described in McCallum (1983, 1999, 2003).20 To determine w1, we solve
an equation of the fth order. Therefore the MSV problem lacks an analytical solution,
making us resort to numerical simulations. To simulate the model, we calibrate parame-
ters , , , , ', z and g and allow the parameters B and 1 to vary across a broad
range of plausible values.
The probability of survival, , is the critical parameter that controls the size of the
19To nd the unknown coe¢ cient w1, we solve a fth order equation in w1. This equation is obtained
using equations (32) and (34) to substitute ination and the output gap in equation (45) that describes
the optimal discretionary policy. Then we apply equations (39) and (40) to the resulting equation to
write the Etx^t+1 and Et^t+1 in terms of b^t+1 and ft . An appendix with analytical derivations is available
on request.
20The method consists in nding a special combination of structural parameters that imply a zero
coe¢ cient for at least one backward-looking variable in the system and that solve the unknown coe¢ cients
problem for this special case. It is then straightforward to choose the solution of the unknown coe¢ cients
problem because it has to return a zero at the coe¢ cient associated with the backward-looking variable.
We use this particular solution to nd values of the unknown coe¢ cients for any possible combination
of the structural parameters of the model. In our model, we focus on the special case of Ricardian
consumers by imposing that the probability of survival is equal to one (i.e.,  = 1). This assumption
makes the state variable b^t+1 irrelevant for the dynamics of the system (32) and (34), implying that real
debt holdings are not part of the minimum set of state variables. Therefore, in this special case, we
select the MSV solution by choosing w1, such that m1 and n1 are equal to zero.
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non-Ricardian channel in the OLG model. Importantly, this parameter relates to the
relevance of real debt uctuations for consumption, as outlined in equation (32), and
therefore controls the overall e¤ect of debt on welfare. In our benchmark calibration, we
set this parameter equal to 0:995 to match the average life expectancy of households of
50 years, consistent with Del Negro et al. (2012). Their analysis uses actuarial life tables
from the Social Security Administration to construct survival probability for individuals
aged 20 years and above, weighting by the population at each age. We also provide
results for additional calibrations of this parameter based on alternative interpretations
advanced in Del Negro et al. (2012). They interpret the probability of survival as the
likelihood that households avoid nancial default, suggesting that a plausible value of 
is in the range of 0:987 and 0:94. Similarly, Nisticó (2016) interprets the perpetual youth
model as one in which agents move in and out of hand-to-mouth status.21 Consequently,
he proposes a value of  equal to 0:93.22 In line with these alternative interpretations,
we provide a sensitivity analysis using the alternative values of  equal to 0:97 and 0:93,
respectively. We we set the discount rate, , equal to 0:9928 to replicate the annual real
interest rate of 3 percent in the data. The value of the elasticity of substitution across
di¤erent goods, , is set to equal 8 to match a steady-state mark-up of approximately 15
percent. The probability of retaining the same price, , is set equal to 0:75, consistent
with an average duration of price changes (i.e., 1=(1   )) of approximately 10 months.
The degree at which leisure contributes to utility, ', is set equal to 0:67 to match the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor equal to 1.5, in line with micro- and macro-
evidence, as described in Keane and Rogerson (2012). We let the parameter, B, vary
between 0 and 8, which implies steady-state, debt-to-output ratios between 0 and 200
percent, respectively. We allow the response of taxes to debt issuance, 1, to cover a wide
21For alternative interpretations of the parameter , see Del Negro et al. (2012).
22The alternative calibrations for parameter  proposed in Del Negro et al. (2012) and Nisticó (2016)
generate a small value for the parameter that encapsulates the propensity to consume out nancial wealth
(). These values are smaller than the large estimate in Castelnuovo and Nisticó (2010), obtained using
Bayesian methods on aggregate data.
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range of values between  2 and 4. Finally, the autoregressive coe¢ cients of exogenous
shocks to technology and public spending, z and g, respectively, are set equal to 0:8,
as in Carlstrom et al. (2009).
Figure 1 plots values of the parameter w1 for a wide range of values of the debt-
to-output ratio (B) and the response of taxation to debt (1) when  = 0:955. The
dark grey area shows the values of 1 and B associated with a stable solution of the
system. The model is stable to the extent that real debt is not on an explosive path,
which requires the condition jw1j < 1 to hold. The gure shows that the response of scal
policy to the changes in real debt holdings must be positive and su¢ ciently strong to
ensure debt stability since the coe¢ cient jw1j becomes greater than 1 for negative values
of 1 and when 1 is very close to 0. In addition, the response of scal policy must be
within certain limits since jw1j becomes greater than 1 for values of 1 close to 2. In the
gure, changes in debt-to-output ratio have limited impact on the value of w1, showing
that the stability of the system is principally related to the response to scal policy to
debt. the system remains stable for a broad range of values of the debt-to-output ratio.
When the probability of survival () decreases, the stability region diminishes but with
a limited quantitative e¤ect.
The gure shows that the value of w1, which enters in the debt equation (48) as the
autoregressive term, decreases with 1 and increases with B. The intuition is straight-
forward. A strong response of taxes to debt supports the reduction of debt and prevents
debt to reach an explosive path. By contrast, a high value of debt-to-output ratio moves
debt further away from the steady state in response to a shock and therefore obstructs
the convergence of debt to the steady state. When 1 is greater than 1, the coe¢ cient
w1 is negative. In this case, the response of scal policy is su¢ ciently strong to generate
a change in taxes that more than o¤sets movements in real debt holdings in the previous
period.
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4.2.1 Nominal Interest Rate and Optimal Policy
Several central banks choose the nominal interest rate to be their main policy instru-
ment. Therefore, it is relevant to derive an equation for the nominal interest rate, which
implements the equilibrium of optimal discretionary monetary policy.
Proposition 4 . A nominal interest rate rule that implements optimal discretionary
monetary policy can be written as:
brt   %^et = xEtx^t+1 + Et^t+1 + bbbt+1; (54)
where the coe¢ cients of the variables are:
x = 1 +
(1  1)x
[x (m1  	) + 2 (m1  	) + n1] (55)
 = 1 +
[ (m1  	) + n1]  +  (1  1)
[x (m1  	) + 2 (m1  	) + n1] (56)
b = 	b +
b
[x (m1  	) + 2 (m1  	) + n1] : (57)
Proof. See Appendix B.
To facilitate interpretation, the optimal discretionary monetary policy rule in equation
(54) is expressed in terms of the nominal interest rate gap. We dene the gap as the
di¤erence between the nominal interest rate under discretion and the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Without the cost-push shock and with Ricardian consumers, the optimal discretionary
policy implies that monetary policy closes the output gap and stabilizes ination by
setting brt to track the interest rate under exible prices, as discussed in Woodford (2003).
In our model, equation (54) shows that this policy is no longer optimal since debt issuance
introduces consumption dispersion across nitely-lived consumers. Although the three
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policy coe¢ cients, x,  and b, appear convoluted, they show that an optimal response
of the nominal interest rate depends on the steady-state, debt-to-output ratio (b) and
the response of taxes to debt (1).
Figures 2 and 3 show that the size of parameter b is substantially smaller than the
size of x and , and it is negatively related with the scal policy parameter 1. In
contrast, both x and  increase with the scal policy paramter 1, showing that a
high response of taxation to debt increases the reaction of monetary policy to changes in
expected ination and the output gap, since movements in debt holdings are principally
stabilized by scal policy. When the debt-to-output ratio (b) increases, the response of
the interest rate to expected ination and the output gap decreases because the welfare
implications of debt stabilization become more relevant. The response of the nominal
interest rate to the endogenous variables increases with the shortening of the expected
lifespan of consumers.
4.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
To investigate the dynamic properties of the model and study the response of the variables
to a public spending shocks, we produce impulse-response functions. To disentangle the
interactions between optimal monetary policy and scal policy, we plot the variables
responses for di¤erent values of the scal policy parameter (1) and debt-to-output ratios
(B).23 In a Ricardian economy, the central bank reacts to a public spending shock by
stabilizing the output gap and the ination rate, allowing the real debt to uctuate.
However, when consumers are non-Ricardian, debt stabilization becomes an additional
target for monetary policy, and the monetary authority now faces a tradeo¤ across policy
objectives. On the one hand, to stabilize ination and the output gap, the central bank
has to raise the real interest rate. On the other hand, the increase in the real interest rate
amplies uctuations in debt holdings due to debt servicing costs. Figures 4 and 6 show
23Figures 8 and 11 in the appendix show the impulse-response functions to the technological shock.
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the variablesresponses to a positive government spending shock when the probability
of surviving is set to  = 0:93.24 Figures 5 and 7 show impulse response functions for
 = 0:995. The shape of the variablesresponses are qualitatively similar for both values
of , but the impact reaction to the shock is larger on the output gap and ination when
 is small. In general, optimal monetary policy entails a limited response in ination and
the output gap and large shifts in debt holdings since they exert a limited wealth e¤ect
on the system.
The impulse response functions are indicative of additional interactions between mon-
etary and scal policy in a non-Ricardian economy. Figures 4 and 5 show that a strong
response of scal policy to debt deviations contributes to reduce uctuations in the econ-
omy since it stabilizes real debt holdings.25 Thus, the interest rate becomes less volatile
over the business cycle. However, changes in the scal policy parameter (1) also a¤ect
the tradeo¤ faced by the central bank, as shown in equation (45). The coe¢ cients x, 
in the interest rate rule increase with the parameter 1, implying a stronger reaction of
the nominal interest rate to uctuations in the output gap and the ination rate. These
two opposing forces stimulate di¤erent responses of the interest rate over the business
cycle, and, a priori, the overall e¤ect on the interest rate is unclear. Impulse response
functions show that overall the response of the nominal interest rate decreases and the
rate primarily tracks the e¢ cient interest rate.26
Figures 6 and 7 show that the public spending shock produces sharp movements in
the output gap and the ination rate when the debt-to-output ratio is large. An increase
in b magnies the wealth-e¤ect channel, and uctuations in real debt holdings have a
larger impact on the economy. Although the nominal (real) interest rate primarily tracks
24The size of innovation in government public spending is equal to one standard deviation.
25Since we focus on values of 1 which are positive and less than 1, we assume that the three alternative
values (0:3, 0; 6 and 0:9) are associated with a weak, medium and strong reaction of lump-sum taxes to
debt deviations from the long-run equilibrium.
26The interest rate gap (brt   Ett+1   %^et ) shows that under discretion, the e¤ect of lower variability
in the endogenous variables dominates over the e¤ect of the increase in the coe¢ cients x and , and
the real interest rate is less responsive in the presence of a strong response of scal policy to movements
in debt.
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the e¢ cient interest rate, it is worth noting that when the debt-to output ratio is small,
the real interest rate is generally larger than the e¢ cient interest rate. However, when the
debt-to-output ratio increases, the response of the real interest rate is smaller than the
response of the e¢ cient rate. This reaction is due to the monetary authoritys prevention
of an increase in the cost of servicing debt, which is attached to the increase in the real
interest rate.
5 Ination Targeting
In a Ricardian economy with lump-sum taxes and complete asset market participation,
the optimal conduct of monetary policy in response to a demand shock is strictly to
stabilize ination since this policy stabilizes the output gap. Woodford (2003) shows
that discretionary monetary policy is equivalent to a zero ination targeting policy. Sec-
tion 4 shows that optimal policy in an economy with non-Ricardian consumers faces a
tradeo¤ in the simultaneous stabilization of ination and the output gap. In this section,
we investigate the extent to which ination targeting remains the optimal conduct of
monetary policy in non-Ricardian economies.
To address this issue, we approximate the changes in the variable f t that tracks ex-
ogenous shocks with the AR(1) process: f t = f

t 1+t, where t is a white noise process
with zero mean and standard deviation, f .27 We make the standard assumption that
monetary policy under ination targeting seeks to stabilize ination at the zero target.
We evaluate strict ination targeting against the discretionary policies by comparing
unconditional welfare losses.28
To derive the unconditional welfare function of each policy, we take the expectations
27In the numerical simulation, the persistence parameter, , is set equal to 0.9. The standard deviation,
f , is set equal to 1.
28We use the unconditional welfare since results are independent from the initial steady state.
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of the welfare function in equation (38) at the beginning of the period (i.e., time t0):

t = Et0
1X
t=0
tLt   1
2
1X
t=0
t
h
axvar (x^t) + var (^t) + abvar

b^t
i
:
The unconditional welfare function under discretion policy (
dis ) and ination tar-
geting (
it) are, respectively:29

dis =
0B@ w
2
2(1+w1)(axm21+n21+ab)
(1 w21)(1 w1)
+ (axm
2
2 + n
2
2)
+2w2(axm1m2+n1n2)(1+w1)
(1 w1)
1CA 2f
(1  2)  1  2 (58)

it =
ab
2
2	2   (1  1)2
	+ (1  1) 
	  (1  1) 
1
1  2
2f
1  2 (59)
Numerical results show that for a wide range of values of parameters, , , , ,
', z and g, welfare is superior under ination targeting more so than with optimal
discretionary policy. Results are robust to values of the response of taxation to debt
(1) and the debt-to-output ratio (b), which ensure stability of the system.
30 Figure 12
shows the ratios between the unconditional welfare losses under discretion and ination
targeting (i.e.,  = log
 

dis=
it

) when  = 0:995. Qualitatively similar results have to
be obtained for the alternative calibrations of . Welfare losses under ination targeting
are lower than under discretionary monetary policy, as implied by values of  larger than
0. However, a strong response of taxes to debt reduces the value of , and as a result,
the two unconditional losses become similar for su¢ ciently large values of 1. The value
of  decreases with the debt-to-output ratio, but this e¤ect is quantitatively limited.
The nding is related to the role played by real debt holdings. Under ination target-
ing, the monetary authority closes the output gap to achieve the ination target without
29To obtain equation (58), we compute the unconditional variance of the output gap, the ination
rate and the real debt by applying the unconditional expectation operator to equations (41) and (43)
and equation (48). We use the assumption that the variance of the exogenous shock ft is the exogenous
source of volatility. To determine the welfare function for ination targeting in equation (59), we impose
the unconditional variance of ination and the output gap to be zero in the steady state.
30An appendix that details the numerical ndings is available on request.
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considering uctuations in debt holdings; the unconditional loss is therefore proportional
to volatility in real debt holdings. Under discretionary policy, by contrast, the monetary
policy responds to changes in debt holdings to strike a balance across the tradeo¤ in the
stabilization of ination, the output gap and real debt holdings. A strong response of
taxes to debt (i.e., a large value of 1) attenuates the volatility of debt and therefore
its relevance in the optimal discretionary policy, making the welfare losses of the discre-
tionary policy similar to those of strict ination targeting. When the debt-to-output ratio
increases, the relative weights of debt stabilization in the loss function become larger,
which increases the welfare loss caused by debt holdings uctuations.
Why is ination targeting welfare enhancing compared to the discretionary policy?
The monetary authority that acts under a discretionary policy exercises some debt
stabilization biasin the attempt to reduce uctuations in real debt holdings by strategi-
cally manipulating private sector expectations on output gap and ination, as described
by equations (39) and (40).31 In the non-Ricardian economy, the stabilization of real
debt holdings also is motivated by the direct e¤ect of movements in debt in the welfare
function. However, our numerical analysis shows that the direct welfare gain from the
stabilization of debt is inferior to the loss generated by the debt stabilization bias.32
6 Conclusion
This paper embeds the perpetual youth model of Blanchard-Yaari into a tractable New
Keynesian framework to investigate the interactions between monetary and scal policies
in the presence of demand shocks. Nominal price rigidities create a link between real ac-
31See Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) for a discussion of the issue.
32In this respect, our analysis is related to the discussion of rules versus discretion for the conduct of
monetary policy. The volume by Taylor (2001) and Clarida et al. (1999) contain several contributions to
this literature. Recent studies by Gali and Monacelli (2005), So¤ritti and Zanetti (2008), Bragoli et al.
(2016) and references therein use a similar framework to study the welfare implications of alternative
policy rules. Unlike these studies, our analysis is focused on the interactions between scal and monetary
policy.
31
tivity and ination, while the OLG structure generates non-neutral e¤ects of issuance of
government debt. Fiscal policy raises lump-sum taxes proportionally to changes in debt
and a¤ects real activity, therefore playing a role for the optimal discretionary monetary
policy. We nd that the optimal discretionary monetary policy involves debt stabiliza-
tion to reduce consumption dispersion across cohorts of consumers and requires to track
current and expected ination and the output gap. The importance of debt stabilization
as an additional objective of monetary policy is proportional to the propensity of con-
sumers to consume nancial wealth, which increases with the debt-to-output ratio and
reduces with the households probability of survival.
Our ndings outline important interactions between monetary and scal policy. When
the response of lump-sum taxes to changes in real debt is strong, monetary policy is
primarily focused on stabilizing output gap and ination. Debt stabilization becomes
more relevant as the reaction of taxes to debt uctuations reduces. Ination targeting is
welfare superior to the optimal discretionary policy, but it is time inconsistent. Under
discretionary monetary policy, the monetary authority strategically uses uctuations in
ination and the output gap to reduce real debt holdings. This debt stabilization bias
generates large uctuations in ination and the output gap that decrease welfare.
We acknowledge some important limitations and interesting extensions for future
research. First, we assume a redistributive scheme that equates the steady-state debt
across cohorts of consumers. Although this assumption greatly simplies the analysis
by ensuring the same steady state across di¤erent cohorts, it would be interesting to
draw more general welfare implications and investigate the extent to which results may
di¤er if the steady-state debt varies across consumers. However, the relaxation of this
assumption requires tracking the evolution of steady-state debt across an innite number
of cohorts to derive the equilibrium of the system. Second, the analysis builds on the
assumption of lump-sum taxes whereas a realistic tax system comprises distortionary
taxes that generate non-Ricardian e¤ects, which may amplify or reduce the real e¤ects of
32
scal policy. Finally, we derive the optimal monetary policy under discretion. Although
it represents a realistic assumption to describe how monetary policy is implemented, a
large volume of research on optimal monetary policy focuses on committed policies. A
credible commitment device may contribute to attenuate the debt stabilization bias that
characterizes discretionary policy. We leave the investigation of these issues to future
research.
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Appendix
A Steady State
To study the dynamics of the system, we approximate the model around the e¢ cient
steady state. In the absence of shocks, the economy converges to a steady state, in which
all variables are constant, with Yt = Y , Ct = C, Nt = N , bt = b, dt = d, wt = w, Rt = R,
t = , Zt = Z and Gt = G.33 From the per capita Euler equation (25) we derive
the steady state of the gross nominal interest rate equal to R = 1=. From the labor
supply equation (26), we derive the steady state of the real wage: w = 'C=(1   N).
From the production technology (27), we nd the steady state of labor input: N = Y ,
where the steady state level of technology, Z, is normalized to 1. From the optimal
price-setting rule (16), we derive w = (   1) = [ (1  {)]Z. Therefore, once we have set
employment subsidy { = 1= that o¤sets distortions due to monopolistic competition,
we obtain w = Z = 1. We assume that the steady-state level of government spending, G,
is zero, whereas it is allowed to vary over time around the steady state. This assumption
is the same of Woodford (2003) and while simplifying the algebra considerably in the
derivation of the welfare function, is innocuous for the main results in the paper and the
properties of the dynamic system.34 Using the aggregate budget constraint (28) together
with N = Y and w = 1 (the e¢ cient steady state for wages), we derive the steady state
of output: Y = 1= (1 + '). We derive the steady-state prot function using equation
(14): d = (1=)Y . Finally, we use the government budget constraint (17) to derive the
steady-state value of real taxation:  = (1  ) b, where  = =P . Hence, the steady-
state values Y , C, N , d, w, R and  depend on the parameters of the model. Note that
33Note that the steady state of the model is the same across cohorts. To see this, consider that the
steady-state consumption equation (10) for a representative agent of age s can be written as: C =
(b+ h) = [(1 + ') ] since Vs = 0 when we aggregate across cohorts, and Bs = B in the steady state since
the redistributive scheme compensates agents for any di¤erence across stready-state levels of nancial
wealth.
34An appendix that details the derivation of the welfare functions under more general conditions is
available on request.
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the level of government debt does not a¤ect the steady state of the variables except for
the value of taxation  since the lump-sum transfers (4) and the redistributive scheme
breaks the link between the debt and the real interest rate. Although the government
bond holdings have no e¤ect on the steady of the economy, we show that di¤erent levels
of government debt may have an impact in terms of welfare losses due to an exogenous
shock.
B Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
This appendix provides the proofs to propositions and lemmas in the paper.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Aggregate Welfare Function, 
t)
Consumer i born in cohort s has the following utility function:

s:t (i) = Et
1X
t=0
t [U (Cs;t(i))  V (Ns;t (i))] ; (60)
where utility is assumed to be separable in consumption and leisure, in which
U (Cs;t) = lnCt; (61)
and
V (Ns;t) = ' ln (1 Ns;t) : (62)
We drop index i since all agents belonging to the same cohort consume the same basket
of goods and provide the same amount of labor.
The second order Taylor expansion of consumption utility function (61) around the
steady state implies:
U (Cs;t)  U
 
C

+ Uc (Ct;s   C) + 1
2
Ucc (Cs;t   C)2 + t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 ;
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where kk is a bound on the amplitude of the exogenous disturbances, and the term
o (kk3) indicates that we neglect terms of third or higher order in deviations from their
steady-state values. Moreover, expanding Cs;t around its steady state yields:
Cs;t
C
 1 + c^s;t + 1
2
c^2s;t + o
 kk3 :
Therefore,
U (Cs;t)  U (C) + UcCc^s;t + 1
2
UcCc^
2
s;t +
1
2
U2ccC
2c^2s;t + o
 kk3 :
Using
Uc =
1
C
Ucc =   1
C2
;
we obtain:
U (Cs;t)  U (C) + UcCc^s;t + t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 ; (63)
where t:i:p: collects policy independent terms (such as constants and functions of ex-
ogenous disturbance). The representative agent model (63) represents the second order
Taylor expansion of consumption utility. However, in the overlapping generation frame-
work, we need to compute the per capita version of such equation:
U (Ct) = (1  )
1X
s=0
sU (Cs;t)  U (C) + UcC [Esc^s;t] + t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 : (64)
The second order log-linearization of equation (19) applied to consumption yields:
c^t = Esc^s;t +
1
2
varsc^t; (65)
40
where varsc^t is the dispersion of consumption across cohorts. Plugging (65) into (64)
yields:
U (Ct)  UcC

c^t   1
2
varsc^t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 : (66)
The next step is to obtain an approximation for the disutility of work. The second order
Taylor expansion of (62) yields:
V (Nt;s)  V (N) + Vn (Nt;s  N) + 1
2
Vnn (Nt;s  N)2 + o
 kk3 ;
where Nt;s is the labor e¤ort of cohort s. In the steady state, we have:
VnnN
Vn
=
N
1 N = :
Therefore,
V (Ns;t)  VnN
bns;t + 1 + 
2
bn2s;t+ t:i:p:+ o  kk3 : (67)
Aggregation across cohorts of the second order Taylor approximated labor utility function
(67) yields:
(1  )
1X
s=0
sV (Ns;t)  VnN

Esbns;t + 1 + 
2
Es
 bn2s;t+ t:i:p:+ o  kk3 :
The second order log-linearization of (19) applied to labor is:
bnt = Esbns;t + 1
2
varsn^t
and the denition for the dispersion of labor across cohorts (varsn^t) is:
varsbnt = bn2t   (Esn^s;t)2 ;
41
allowing us to write the approximated utility of leisure as
V (Nt)  VnN

n^t +

2
varsn^t +
1 + 
2
n^2t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 : (68)
To get rid of n^t we use the second order log-linear approximation of equation (27):
n^t +
1
2
n^2t = y^t +
1
2
y^2t + bzt + 12bz2t + y^tbzt + ^t; (69)
where ^t denotes the log-price dispersion across monopolistic rms. Using (69) into (68)
yields:
V (Nt)  VnN

y^t +
1 + 
2
y^2t   (1 + ) y^tbzt + ^t + 2varsbns;t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 : (70)
Since we assume that the distortions due to monopolistic competition have been removed
by an employment subsidy nanced by lump-sum taxes, the steady state labor/leisure
tradeo¤ equation (26) implies that:
'VnN = UcC:
We therefore can write equation (70) as:
V (Nt)  UcC

y^t +
1 + 
2
y^2t   (1 + ) y^tbzt + ^t + 2varsbns;t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 : (71)
By combining equation (66) and (71) and using the identity
c^t + g^t = y^t;
42
we are able to write the second order approximation of equation (60) as:

t   UcC

1 + 
2
y^2t   (1 + ) y^tbzt + g^t + ^t + 2varsn^t + 12varsc^t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 :
Moreover, using the denition of e¢ cient output (31), we arrive at:

t   UcC

1 + 
2
(y^t   y^et )2 + ^t +

2
vars bNt + 1
2
varsc^t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 : (72)
As shown by Gali and Monacelli (2008):
^t = +

2
varj p^t (h) : (73)
Moreover, following Woodford (2003) (chapter 6) we arrive at this denition:
1X
t=0
tt =
"
(1  ") (1  ")
1X
t=0
t2t + t:i:p: (74)
where
t = varhp^t (h) :
Inserting (73) and (74) into (72) yields:

t   UcC

1 + 
2
x^2t +

(1  ) (1  )

2
^2t +

2
varsbnt + 1
2
varsc^t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 :
(75)
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Finally, from the log-linearized version of (8), we note that:
varsbnt = varsc^t
2
;
which inserted into (75) yields:

t   

axx^
2
t + ^
2
t + ~abvarsc^t

+ t:i:p:+ o
 kk3 ;
where
x^t = y^t   y^et ;
ax = (1 + )
(1  ) (1  )

=


;
~ab =
1 + 

(1  ) (1  )

=
ax

:
Proof of Proposition 2 (Welfare Function and Debt Holdings)
First we note that from the log-linear version of equation (10), the dispersion of con-
sumption across generations is proportional to the dispersion of debt:
varsc^t =
1
(1 + ')22
varsb^t:
Since both varsb^t and varsb^t+1are predetermined at time t, we can follow Woodford
(2003) in solving equation (37) backward to obtain:
varsc^t = varsc^ 1 + (1  )
tX
f=0
t f

B

2
b^2t ; (76)
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where varsc 1 could be any (small) degree of consumption dispersion in the period before
the rst period for which a new policy is contemplated that is independent from policy.
Taking the discounted value of (76) over the entire period at t  0 we obtain:
1X
t=0
tvarsbct = 1  
1  

1

B
1 + '
2 1X
t=0
tb^2t+1;
which substituted in equation (36) leads to the welfare function (38).
Proof of Proposition 3 (Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy)
The problem of an innitively lived central banker is to choose a path for r^t %et , to solve
the Bellman equation:
V (bt; f

t ) = min
rt %t

 1
2

xx^
2
t + 
2
t + bb^
2
t

+ EtV
 
bt+1; f

t+1

;
subject to the law of motion for debt
b^t+1 =
brt   %t
1 + n1

+
1  1
 (1 + n1)
b^t +

1  n2
1 + n1

f t
where
Etx^t+1 = m

b^t+1; f

t

= m1b^t+1 +m2f

t ; (77)
Et^t+1 = n

b^t+1; f

t

= n1b^t+1 + n2f

t (78)
b^t+1 = (brt   Et^t+1   %t ) + 1 (1  1) b^t + f t :
The rst order conditions with respect to the control variable (r^t   %et ) and the state
45
variable b^t are respectively:
Et
@V
 
bt+1; f

t+1

@bt+1
= +xx^t

	b +m1   1


+ ^t

n1 +  (	b +m1   1)


+ bb^t+1;
(79)
and
Et
@V
 
bt+1; f

t+1

@bt+1
=
(1 + n1)
(1  1)
@V (bt; f

t )
@b^t+1
+ bb^t+1 + x

	b +m1 + n1


x^t + (80)
+

n1 +  (	b +m1 + n1)


^t
Combining equations (79) and (80) yields:
@EtV (bt; f

t )
@bt
=  1  1

xx^t   1  1

^t (81)
Forwarding equation (81) one period ahead and substituting in (79), we obtain the
optimal condition in Proposition (3):
 1  1

xEtx^t+1 1  1

Et^t+1 bb^t+1 = x

	b +m1   1


x^t+
n1 +  (	b +m1   1)

^t
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Proposition 4 (Nominal Interest Rate that Implements Discretionary Optimal
Policy)
Using the Phillips curve (78) to substitute for ^t in the optimal condition (45) and then
using the IS equation (77) to get rid of x^t we obtain:
r^t   %t = xEtx^t+1 + Ett+1 + bb^t+1;
where the parameters x, and b are dened as part of the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Deviation of per Capita Real Debt)
Taking the log-linearized version of equations (7) and (25), subtracting one from the
other and computing the dispersion across generation yields:
varsc^t =
1

varsEtc^t+1 +
1  

 
c^NBt+1   c^t+1
2
;
which after applying the log-linerized version of equation (24), reduces to the recursive
expression for the dispersion of consumption in equation (37).
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a public spending shock ( = 0:995 ; b = 3:6).
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Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a public spending shock ( = 0:93;1 = 0:5).
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Figure 7: Impulse response functions to a public spending shock ( = 0:995 ; 1 = 0:5).
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Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a technological shock ( = 0:93 ; b = 3:6).
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Figure 9: Impulse response functions to a technological shock ( = 0:995 ; b = 3:6).
52
0 5 10 15 20 25
-5
0
5
x 10-3 output gap
ub=2.4
ub=5.2
ub=8.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
-6
-4
-2
0
x 10-3 inflation
ub=2.4
ub=5.2
ub=8.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.4
-0.2
0
debt
ub=2.4
ub=5.2
ub=8.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.4
-0.2
0
nominal interest rate
ub=2.4
ub=5.2
ub=8.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.4
-0.2
0
real interest rate
ub=2.4
ub=5.2
ub=8.0
0 5 10 15 20 25
-2
0
2
4
x 10-3 interest rate gap ub=2.4
ub=5.2
ub=8.0
Figure 10: Impulse response functions to a technological shock ( = 0:93 ; 1 = 0:5).
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions to a technological shock ( = 0:995 ; 1 = 0:5).
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Figure 12: Ratio of unconditional loss functions
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